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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
COPSEY V. PARK: WHEN RELEVANT AND NECESSARY, A
DEFENDANT MAY PRESENT EVIDENCE OF A NONPARTY'S
NEGLIGENCE
TO
PROVE
THAT
THE
DEFENDANT WAS EITHER NOT NEGLIGENT OR THAT A
SUPERSEDING CAUSE CONTRIBUTED TO THE ALLEGED
HARM.
By: Genevieve Hornik
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a non-party's
negligence is admissible if it is relevant and necessary for the defendant to
prove that they were either not negligent or that other independent causes
contributed to the alleged harm. Copsey v. Park, 453 Md. 141, 148, 160
A.3d 623, 626-27 (2017). Evidence of a non-party's negligence is necessary
to provide a defendant a fair trial because the jury needs the evidence to
determine causation. Id. at 156, 160 A.3d at 632. Therefore, the court held
that any alleged prejudice caused by admitting the evidence did not outweigh
its probative value. Id.
Lance D. Copsey ("Copsey") went to the emergency room on February 4,
2010, after slipping, falling, and hitting his head during a game of
racquetball. After a normal CT scan, Copsey was released from the hospital.
Copsey sought medical treatment on May 26 and June 1, 2010, due to his
worsening symptoms. On June 4, 2010, Dr. Charles Iliff ("Dr. Iliff') ordered
a CT scan and MRI/MRA for Copsey. The defendant, Dr. Park, interpreted
the results and reported that the images were normal. On June 5, 2010 Dr.
Larry Blum ("Dr. Blum") independently reviewed the MRI and MRA images
and concurred there were no abnormalities.
On June 9, 2010, after Copsey's symptoms returned, he visited Dr. Blum
who ordered a new MRI and requested an urgent interpretation of the image.
Dr. Vijay Viswanathan ("Dr. Viswanathan") interpreted the MRI and noted
abnormalities, including brain cell death caused by insufficient flow of
blood. Dr. Viswanathan failed to relay his findings to Dr. Blum or Copsey.
Thereafter, Dr. Blum reviewed the images with Copsey, without Dr.
Viswanathan's report, found no abnormalities, and released Copsey from the
hospital. After Copsey went home, Dr. Viswanathan discussed the abnormal
results of the MRI with Dr. Damanhuri Alkaitis ("Dr. Alkaitis"), the
covering physician for Dr. Blum. Copsey was never told about the abnormal
scan and suffered a stroke the next day. He died on June 13, 2010 from
complications related to the stroke.
On September 27, 2011, Jenny J. Copsey ("Mrs. Copsey") filed survival
and wrongful death actions against Dr. Park, Dr. Viswanathan, Dr. Blum,
and Dr. Alkaitis. All the parties, aside from Dr. Park, were dismissed
following pre-trial settlements. Mrs. Copsey filed a motion in limine to
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exclude evidence relating to Dr. Blum's and Dr. Alkaitis' prior statuses as
defendants. She also attempted to prevent Dr. Park from raising the defense
that the negligence of subsequent treating physicians lead to Copsey's death.
The circuit court denied both motions. On September 24, 2014, the jury
found that Dr. Park did not breach the standard of care and acted as a
reasonable physician under the circumstances. Copsey filed a timely appeal.
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed, upholding the
introduction of evidence of a non-party's negligence and causation. Mrs.
Copsey filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to determine if the trial court erred by admitting
evidence of non-party subsequent treating physicians' negligence. It also
analyzed whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on superseding
cause, when the negligence of all the treating physicians amounted to one
indivisible injury, Copsey's death.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began by reviewing the lower court's
reliance on Martinez in allowing evidence of non-party negligence to be
admitted. Copsey, 453 Md. at 159, 160 A.3d at 633. Martinez justified the
admittance of evidence of prior third parties' negligence in a medical injury
case. Copsey, 435 Md. at 159, 160 A.3d at 633 (citing Martinez v. Johns
Hopkins Hosp., 212 Md.App. 634, 70 A.3d 397). Mrs. Copsey argued that
Martinez did not apply since the Martinez court dealt with evidence prior to
the physician's treatment. In contrast, Dr. Park argued that the evidence of
superseding negligence broke the causal link. Copsey, 435 Md. at 158, 160
A.3d at 633. Mrs. Copsey further claimed that the lower court erred by
allowing evidence of non-parties' negligence, because it diverted the jury's
attention away from Dr. Park's actions. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 632.
Furthermore, she claimed that the admission could sway the jury into finding
that all the guilty parties had settled leaving the only innocent party, Dr.
Park, to fight the suit on his own. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 632. The court
ultimately applied Martinez since it addressed whether a physician accused
of negligence could present evidence of a non-party's negligence as a
defense. Id. at 161, A.3d at 635. The Court of Appeals of Maryland found
that the issue of whether the non-parties' treatment of the patient was before
or after the accused physician's treatment was irrelevant. Id. Instead, the
court found the relevant issue to be whether the jury had a materially
complete picture of the facts. Id. at 161-62, A.3d at 635. Because barring
evidence of the non-parties' negligence would have given the jury an
incomplete picture of the facts, the court found the evidence relevant and
admissible. Id.
Next, the court reviewed the trial court's jury instruction on superseding
cause. Copsey, 435 Md. at 163, A.3d at 636. A superseding cause defense
arises when "unusual" and/or "extraordinary" independent intervening
negligent acts occur. Copsey, at 166, 160 A.3d at 637 (citing Pittway Corp.
v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 249, 973 A.2d 771, 789(2009)). Mrs. Copsey
argued that Dr. Park's negligence began a six-day delay that proximately
caused Copsey's death. Copsey, 435 Md. at 158, 160 A.3d at 633. Dr. Park
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denied negligence, but argued if he was negligent, he was not the proximate
cause of Copsey's death. Id. at 165, 160 A.3d at 636. He claimed that the
evidence showed the superseding negligence of the other treating physicians
broke his causal link to Copsey's death. Id. at 158, 160 A.3d at 633.
The court noted that both sides presented expert testimony regarding
whether Dr. Park was acting within the standard of care. Copsey, 453 Md. at
167, 160 A.3d at 638. After the testimony, the jury was free to weigh the
evidence and decide whose expert was more credible. Id. at 167, 160 A.3d at
639. The expert testimony supported a reasonable jury finding that Dr. Park's
alleged negligence or the negligence of the superseding doctors caused
Copsey's death. Id. The court stated that because the facts presented
supported more than one reasonable inference, the jury had to determine
whether Dr. Park was a part of a single chain of negligence or if superseding
negligence broke his causal tie to Copsey's death. Id. at 166, 160 A.3d at
638 (citing Pittway, 409 Md. at 253, 973 A.2d at 792). Therefore, the trial
court was correct to give the jury instruction on proximate cause, since the
jury was presented with evidence relevant to proximate cause. Copsey, 453
Md. at 167, 160 A.3d at 638.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that evidence of a non-party's
negligence is admissible if the evidence is used to prove a defendant is not
negligent or is not the proximate cause of the negligence. This ruling allows
defendants to offer more evidence, apart from their own actions, in defense
of negligent charges against them. This ruling also affects non-party
physicians who treated a plaintiff in a negligence case because it allows for
the non-party physicians' treatment to be scrutinized by a jury. This could
lead to more time and money spent during discovery for medical malpractice
cases because more records and interviews may be needed from multiple
treating physicians.

